coerced labor and their replacement with modem notions of "free labor" in the early nineteenth century. Henceforth, there would not be degrees of practical "unfreedom"; both labor and personal status were exclusively free or slave. Compulsion persisted longest in the institutions of indentured service and apprenticeship, chiefly on the rationale that, however coercive those institutions were, they were voluntary. Unfree labor was thereby consistent with contractarian individualism (pp. 90-91, 105-11) . But if ideological accommodation permitted coerced labor to persist into the era of capitalism, it was also ideology rather than economics that led to its final rejection. Steinfeld argues that, in the early nineteenth century, the increasing opposition of working people to coerced labor forced common law judges to view even voluntary coerced labor as little different from slavery, and hence as illegitimate (pp. 94, 123-27, 159, 163) .
To make this ambitious set of claims, Steinfeld relies on an impressive command of sprawling bodies of legal and historical scholarship -English and colonial and antebellum American. The result is an account that on the whole is compelling. Regardless of its ultimate success, the Steinfeld account is the most ambitious attempt in many decades to grapple with the intellectual history of Anglo-American labor law. In an age of scholarly monographs, Steinfeld has undertaken a task of almost heroic sweep.
I. THE TRADITIONAL ACCOUNT OF LABOR LAW AND ITS PROBLEMS
What is the matter with the traditional account of labor law? It offers a smooth explanation of the legal shifts from thirteenth-century serfdom to nineteenth-century wage labor, largely by identifying legal change as a corollary to social, economic, and demographic trends. According to this account, laborers were largely unfree and immobile in the medieval period, but they secured legal freedom in the favorable economic climate of the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. After that time, most Englishmen worked for wages, and what quaintly became known as the law of "master and servant" was, for all but resident household servants and apprentices, the law of employeremployee. At the heart of this traditional account is the early date at which laboring men and women became legally free.
Before considering the difficulties -for both Steinfeld and this reviewer -with the traditional account, it is necessary to sketch out its major arguments more fully. In the High Middle Ages, English society was overwhelmingly agrarian, and labor was unfree. This characterization is axiomatic for serfs or "villeins," since the essence of their legal status lay in their being bound to the soil and obliged to provide their manorial lords with labor services. But even persons of legally free status might owe labor services in exchange for their land. 5 While these free persons formally could withdraw their labor, as a practical matter few wanted to abandon their land. 6 Moreover, the separation of personal status and land tenure under early common law meant that personally free peasants could hold land by unfree tenure involving labor services. As a result, many medieval persons, whether legally free or not, lived under a regime of coerced labor.
All this began to change by the fourteenth century. A century of prosperity had brought rural England close to the Malthusian trap: too many mouths, overintensive cultivation, and declining crop yields. 7 Many lords commuted labor obligations, replacing serf labor with cheaper hired labor, 8 and elsewhere serfs fled in search of opportunity. The decline of manorial serfdom was accelerated by the Black Death, which carried off approximately one third of the population. 9 With labor suddenly scarce, both serfs and free peasants managed to cut better deals for themselves. In what was tantamount to a lengthy nationwide process of renegotiation and redistribution, peasants took on larger landholdings of better land and on more favorable terms, owing money rents rather than labor in kind -all backed by the new power of their actual or implicit threats to withdraw labor and move to a new lord. For some 150 years, the relative scarcity of labor gave the upper hand to smallholders and laborers. 10 Significantly, the peas-5. See, e.g., H. s. BENNETT, LIFE ON THE ENGLISH MANOR: A STUDY OF PEASANT CON-DITIONS 1150-1400, at 103 (1937) (terming labor services by free tenants "exceptional"); ED-WARD MILLER, THE ABBEY AND BISHOPRIC OF ELY 128-29, 141 (1951) (documenting free men owing similar services to those of unfree men, including labor); 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FRE-DERIC \V. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 370-71 (2d ed. 1968 ) (stressing uncertainty of labor, rather than labor services, as a test of villein tenure); CUSTUMALS OF THE MANORS OF LAUGHTON, WILLINGDON AND GORING xxx, 3-8 (Arthur E. Wilson ed., 60 Sussex Record Socy. 1961) .
6. John Hatcher, English Serfdom and Villeinage: Towards a Reassessment, PAST & PRES- ENT, Feb. 1981, at 3, 16-24. 7. See H.E. HALLAM, RURAL ENGLAND 1066 -1348 , at 245-64 (1981 HIST. 18, 29 (1970) , reprinted in EvsEY D. DOMAR, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM & SERFDOM 225, 235-36 (1989) (surveying thirteenth-century commutation and suggesting an economic model).
9. See, e.g., PHILIP ZIEGLER, THE BLACK DEATH 238 (1969 1200-1520, at 216-17 (1989) ; PAUL D.A. HARVEY, A MEDIEVAL OXFORDSHIRE VILLAGE: CUXHAM, 1240 TO 1400 , at 139 (1965 ; Michael M. Postan, The Fifteenth Century, 9 ECON. HIST. REV. 160, 166 (1939) . Of course the picture is more complex than this sketch permits. See, e.g., J.L. BOLTON, MEDIEVAL ENGLISH EcONOMY, 1150 -1500 , at 211-14 (1980 (demesne farmers prosper until 1370s); DYER, supra, at 231 (masters probably forced their increasingly costly labor force to work harder); HARVEY, [Vol. 91:1382 antry of England was able to win not only better economic terms, but also de facto or even legal freedom. · This wresting of legal freedom was not achieved without struggle. There had long been manorial and burghal rules forbidding free movement of labor and mandating customary wages (p. 28), and the Ordinance of Laborers (1349) and the Statute of Laborers (1351) adapted these rules for national application (pp. 22-23, 28-30) . Through these acts, manorial lords and a national government responsive to their interests tried to restrain the mobility of labor and the level of wages. But legislation could not successfully restrain wages and labor mobility in the face of landowners who were interested in controlling their own workers and luring their neighbors' workers, and laborers who knew how to flee, purchase exemptions, resist forcibly, and use the litigation process. I I Legislation also could not stand in the way of strong demographic and economic trends. I 2 Since unfree peasants and laborers consistently sought free status, the decline of serfdom was inevitable. I3 By the late fourteenth century, serfdom was clearly on the wane, and by the mid-sixteenth century it was all but gone.
The decline of English serfdom did not mean that peasants and laborers continued to enjoy rising standards of living. On the contrary, living standards tended to fall from the early sixteenth century, dispossession of the peasantry accelerated, and the ranks of the landless and the poor swelled. I 4 The traditional account of labor law was based in part on these findings. Indeed, the early twentieth-century supra, at 139-40 (small farmers were thrown back on family labor only, since hired labor was now too expensive); RODNEY H. HILTON, THE DECLINE OF SERFDOM IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 38-43 (2d ed. 1969 12. See, e.g., DYER, supra note 10, at 218-19 (legal regulation widely thought ineffective, though statutes possibly succeeded in deterring some labor mobility and wage demands); Demar, supra note 8, at 29 (legislation ineffective against economic forces). Indeed, modem free market disciples have often cited the late medieval statutes for the general proposition that wage-price controls never work to restrain market forces in the long run.
13. Trrow, supra note 11, at 58. But see I.S. Leadam, The Last Days of Bondage in England, 9 L.Q. REV. 348 (1893) (arguing that villeinage persisted until the late sixteenth century).
14. See, e.g., A.L. BEIER, MASTERLESS MEN: THE VAGRANCY PROBLEM IN ENGLAND, 1560 -1640 , at 18-24 (1985 ; HILTON, supra note 10, at 57; W.G. HOSKINS, THE AGE OF PLUN-DER: KING HENRY'S ENGLAND, 1500-1547, at 60-72 (1976) ; JOHN POUND, POVERTY AND VAGRANCY IN TUDOR ENGLAND 3-25 (1971) ; PAUL SLACK, THE ENGLISH POOR LAW 1531-1782, at 11 (1990) . landmark histories of labor and poverty were typically written by reformers and social activists. 15 The reformers knew of the massive rural dispossession of the peasantry beginning in the sixteenth centuryof which Sir Thomas More famously warned 16 -and of the dangers of an increasing population and price inflation in a subsistence economy. The reformers also knew of the contemporary perception that poverty and vagrancy were on the rise and that the highways, forests, and cities swarmed with "masterless men."
The traditional account of labor law provides, however, that English labor enjoyed legally free status from an early date, approximately the late Middle Ages. 17 When common law's only unfree statusvilleinage -fell into desuetude in the century after the Black Death, all persons necessarily were free. 18 The enforcement of the late medieval labor statutes represented the attempt to extract labor from free men, and the governance of labor was a separate question from that of personal status. As for early modem labor statuses and institutions that bore the hallmarks of unfreedom -such as apprenticeship, servitude by annual retainer or indenture, impressment into military service, and bridewell work pursuant to the poor relief acts 19 -the traditional account holds that they did not imply unfree personal status. Only villeinage could constitute common law servitude, and, as Sir Thomas Smith wrote in the 1560s, " [n] [Vol. 91:1382 that English labor, however oppressed in fact or in law, was fundamentally free labor, subject to regulation only at the margins.
Steinfeld bridles against this traditional account, and there is much to support his discomfiture. The peasants and laborers of medieval England were not uniformly unfree. Many, perhaps most, manors relied on hired work, often performed by landless men, in addition to the labor of serfs holding land by precarious customary terms. 22 These hired workers and their payments, in wages or grain ("liveries"), may seem like a distortion of classic feudal theory, but they were structural features of English manorialism, The picture of a largely unfree peasantry exchanging its labor for land is simply incomplete. Indeed, in the twelfth century, wage labor became a dominant form of labor, as lords and long-term lessees of manors ("farmers") commuted the labor obligations of peasants and replaced the serfs with hired laborers. 23 Twelfth-century lords were capable of behaving like profitmaximizing employers of free labor, rather than like feudal lords saddled with customary labor. 2 4 Significantly, these hired laborers tended to be free, de facto and sometimes de jure. 25 Perhaps their freedom meant little more than that they were free to move when pushed and free to accept the least unattractive employment offer; if so, medieval hired laborers were free in a way that their nineteenth-century descendants might have found familiar. But the traditional account of labor also distorts medieval freedom more generally by presenting almost all labor as coerced, dependent, and ipso facto unfree. Long before the Black Death, money payments replaced labor service on many manors, such that even villeins often did not render labor under coercion; instead, their "labor service" was a measure of additional rent and a badge of their formal status. When lords sought to extract customary labor or pay below market wages, peasants often resisted, challenging both the obligation to work and its implication of unfree status. 26 In fact, we have only recently realized the profound complexity of legal status and personal THROW OF COLONIAL SLAVERY 1776 -1848 , at 41 (1988 and tenurial freedom that existed from the late eleventh to mid-thirteenth centuries. 27 Certainly common law villeinage, as it was devised in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries, was not simply a restatement of traditional unfree status. Rather, villeinage was a particular configuration of legal disabilities and tests, cast in new binary (freeunfree) form and imposed on at least some persons who had always considered themselves free or free enough. Nor does the traditional narrative satisfactorily explain sixteenthand seventeenth-century "free labor." The traditional account insists that labor institutions such as indentured servitude, apprenticeship, and military impressment operated on free persons and were consistent with their personal freedom. But these were coercive and frequently brutal practices, and in more candid moments contemporaries recognized that they differed little from slavery or serfdom (p. 101). Given the prevalence of these practices, there is little to gain from denying that the common law sanctioned certain forms of servile labor, and much to commend in characterizing early modern labor as significantly unfree.
If anything, coercive labor practices seemed to expand in the early modern period. It is very well to point, as generations of common lawyers have, to the short life of the notorious Vagrancy Act of 1547, 28 the only statute that expressly created a slave status for Englishmen. The act was repealed almost immediately after its enactment, and most commentators took its repeal to support the proposition that English law would tolerate no status but freedom. But the arrangements routinely made under the Old Poor Law for paupers, including forcible work in bridewells 29 and the placement of pauper children as "parish apprentices" (p. 120) in dangerous occupations, were harshly coercive. 30 Moreover, late Tudor evidence shows that men were consigned to the galleys as slaves and that, at least for (Vol. 91:1382 those individuals, the law did not flinch from explicit slave status. 31 The rapid growth of indentured servitude and Indian and black slavery in the colonies is, of course, even more damaging to the received picture of free labor. Colonial indentured servitude relied on certain formal doctrines from the English law of apprenticeship and servitude, but it was a radically different, and consistently more brutal, institution as practiced in the New World. Indeed, plantation slavery was wholly new to the common law. Granted, it is possible to differentiate metropolitan free labor from these colonial practices and to argue that colonial labor innovations did not affect the general proposition that at home all men and labor were free. The common law relied on this metropolitan-colonial distinction, and the courts of a number of Continental powers did so as well. 32 But this distinction was far from convincing, and servitude and slavery in the colonies coexisted uneasily with the notion that common law recognized only free labor and free status with the exception of "villeinage." As a result, the traditional proposition that all labor was free by the sixteenth century represents a circular legal description and an inadequate social description.
II. STEINFELD'$ REINTERPRETATION OF FREE AND COERCED LABOR
Steinfeld responds to the traditional picture of free labor by presenting a radically different model, consisting of three related arguments. First, most labor was governed by coercion -the legal obligation to work and finish one's work on pain of specific performance, imprisonment, or other forms of legal compulsion. In that sense, labor was unfree in practice until at least the eighteenth century, in both England and its American colonies (chs. 2-4). Second, nobody conflated the coercion of labor with the slave status of plantation blacks because the common law assumed that all (whites) were free and because the modem free-unfree dichotomy is itself an anachronism that has little applicability until the late eighteenth century (pp. 10, 13, 53-54, 99-104) . Third, the replacement of the unfree labor paradigm with the new "free labor" model was not an inevitable byproduct of eighteenth-or nineteenth-century capitalism, but rather resulted from ideological struggles in which republicanism, the American Revolution, and the persistence of the increasingly odious institution of black slavery (pp. 137-46) impelled average American working men and women to act (pp. 181 modem "freedom" is best understood as the interaction of labor regulations and social institutions, and not as the formal ascription of common law "free" status. Traditional legal historians would find this first step to be strained and doctrinally wrong, since by its own terms the common law defined free status not in terms of legal disabilities on labor, but rather as the opposite of villeinage. Steinfeld's aim, however, is not to account for doctrine in its traditional common law pigeonholes, but to use doctrine to explain larger legal and social structures. Having decoupled his inquiry from reliance on the law of villeinage or the practices of manorial serfdom, Steinfeld proceeds to assemble his case for the unfreedom of labor prior to the nineteenth century. He emphasizes a careful parsing of the two principal regulatory statutes, the Statute of Laborers (1351) and the Statute of Artificers (1563), and an analysis of their enforcement (pp. 22-23, 28-30, 77-78) . Through this point in his argument, Steinfeld's presentation is original in two senses. First, his claim that the regulatory scheme was not merely oppressive, but also defined a regime of coerced labor, goes considerably further than the claims of previous progressive historians. 33 Second, he makes this argument by emphasizing certain littleremembered but critical provisions of the two major labor statutes. Earlier studies of labor regulation have consistently focused on other provisions of these statutes, chiefly those addressing wage-fixing and mandatory apprenticeship, 34 perhaps because enforcement of these provisions seemed most amenable to quantitative testing. In contrast, Steinfeld stresses the general statutory requirements that various classes of persons seek work and that anyone obligated to work complete his term or task on pain of imprisonment or forcible specific performance (pp. 22-24, 30-31, 36-37) . He thereby succeeds in using familiar evidence in a novel way, anchoring the statutes in the context of unfreedom.
Steinfeld's general claim that labor and persons were meaningfully "unfree" in terms of being subject to coercion (p. 102) is both original and correct, but some of Steinfeld's legal arguments rely on evidence that is more ambivalent in practice than he allows. Consider the Statute of Artificers (1563), a central element in his treatment of labor law (pp. 23-24, 31-33, 38-40) . Steinfeld should not be faulted for assembling a relatively small body of case law to support his contention that, under the Statute's sections 2-6, local officials were able to force persons to enter or complete terms of service. As he notes, the incomplete state of local recordkeeping prior to the seventeenth century [ Vol. 91:1382 partly explains the dearth of record entries, as does the fact that certain enforcement steps could be taken by one or two justices acting informally. 35 But the Statute of Artificers' ideological support for a regime of unfree labor is undermined by evidence that some masters denounced the act and that other provisions of the statute were at times popular with working people. Legislators and magistrates often opposed the statute's apprenticeship provision as a cause of unemployment and economic stagnation, 36 thus anticipating Adam Smith's later views. 37 Conversely, for at least some struggling journeymen, the statutory requirement that persons serve apprenticeships before entering certain trades was protective rather than burdensome, since it prevented a flood of newly admitted competitors leading to the impoverishment of all. 38 Similarly, the wage-fixing provisions of the Statute have been widely denounced by later scholars, both Left and Right. 39 Contemporaries, however, saw wage fixing differently. On some occasions paternalist Tudor-Stuart governments pressed local magistrates to raise wages. 40 Well into the eighteenth century many working people viewed statutory assessments not as coercive but benevolent, and they sought new assessments to raise wages. 41 35. Pp. 29-30, 229 n.63; see also ROBERT B. SHOEMAKER, PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT: PETIT CRIME AND THE LAW IN LoNDON AND RURAL MIDDLESEX, C. 1660-1725, at 38-39, 54, 83, 87, 174, 184-85 (1991) . The legal authority of masters to beat their errant household employees frequently made resorting to formal sanctions unnecessary and also explains the lack of cases. LABOR 116, 118, 124, 203-04 (1962) The more general problem with reading the Statute of Artificers to imply a regime of coerced labor is that labor in the Tudor-Stuart period was notoriously unsettled. The geographic mobility of English laborers, servants, youth, and the poor is well documented. 42 Admittedly, the Steinfeld model can tolerate high levels of geographic mobility, because coerced labor is consistent with laborers and servants moving seasonally, annually, or at other intervals (pp. 27, 34), provided that at each new job the same statutory framework and premises applied. But the high levels of geographic mobility might rather point toward a regime in which labor discipline was challenged and labor freedom asserted against Steinfeldian unfreedom. From this viewpoint, criminal sanctions and specific performance for labor contracts existed chiefly on paper, and local magistrates devoted more energy to moving the poor and underemployed to other parishes than to keeping laborers in place. 43 In fact, much of the best social history of the past thirty years describes people who did not lead orderly, settled lives regulated by the work regimen of the Statute of Artificers.
Beneath the surface stability of rural England, then, the vast placid open fields which catch the eye, was the seething mobility of forest squatters, itinerant craftsmen and building labourers, unemployed men and women seeking work, strolling players, minstrels and jugglers, pedlars and quack doctors, gipsies, vagabonds, tramps: congregated especially in London and the big cities, but also with footholds wherever newly-squatted areas escaped from the machinery of the parish or in old-squatted areas where labour was in demand. 44 (1911) 161-62 (1987) (availability oflabor laws as additional sanction against poor and laboring defendants who had been acquitted by juries); SLACK, supra note 14, at 37-38 (provisions against labor mobility rarely applied against arriving young males whose labor was needed). 48-49 (1975) . [Vol. 91:1382 We have learned to look for these "masterless men," in forest, heath, and waste, on the roads and in markets, in coastal and wealden villages, in mining and weaving areas -in all the dark corners of the land where men could "live out of sight or out of slavery"; 45 in alehouses everywhere; 46 in open parishes; in urban sanctuaries where the king's writ did not run; 47 and even in southeastern and midlands champion-country villages with resident gentry.
CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN
This undisciplined quality of early modern labor was not merely the consequence of administrative weakness and local recalcitrance. On the contrary, it grew out of the structure of the premodern English economy. Most persons, regardless of their legal or labor status (servants in husbandry, hired laborers, smallholders, craftsmen, the working poor) were sometimes unemployed and often underemployed. 48 Of necessity, they turned to second occupations, 49 small gardens, petty industrial production, a range of craft skills, and such undesirable activities -in the eyes of men of property -as keeping tippling houses, so begging, and committing crimes. This need to develop other sources of income was strongest in pastoral and woodland areas, but dual employment and multiple occupations were characteristic responses everywhere to endemic underemployment in a subsistence agrarian economy. Like geographic mobility, chronic underemployment and multiple employment undermined the statutory regimen of a dependent, stable workforce working twelve hours (excluding breaks) in summer and from dawn to nightfall in winter, under annual or sixmonth retainers, for masters who possessed quasi-feudal rights of jurisdiction over their employees.
However uncoerced English working life may have been in prac- tice, such freedom does not undermine Steinfeld's position that a stable, coerced labor force was the legal ideal. "It is not uncommon for a society to be torn between ideal and reality, and the people of early seventeenth-century England experienced this tension to an unusual degree." 51 For Steinfeld, the reality was that labor was coerced when necessary. The significance of the statutory labor regime is thus the availability of coercion rather than its consistent application. But it also is likely that the government officials and men of property who drafted and enforced the Tudor-Stuart scheme of labor regulation recognized the divergence between ideal and reality and knew that stable labor was, at best, a dated medieval ideal that grew less practical with each decade. 52 If so, rather than embodying, recapitulating, or reasserting a particular legal or social theory, Tudor-Stuart labor regulation may instead represent the government's short-and middle-term, ameliorative efforts to respond to a series of perceived domestic socialwelfare crises.
Thus, Steinfeld reads the Statute of Artificers as an attempt to reassert and extend the notions of tied, coerced labor articulated in earlier legislation, notions that local justices applied as needed for almost two centuries and masters and employers accepted everywhere (pp. 63-64). But other historians see the Statute as an attempt to respond to shortterm crises, particularly in the wool and textile industries. 53 They see the Statute as part of larger, ongoing legislative programs to address crime, poverty, vagrancy, squatting, unchecked urban expansion, unlicensed alehouses, price inflation, depression in the textile and other industries, unemployment and underemployment, silted harbors, agricultural instability, rural depopulation and enclosure, failure to attend church, ignorance about matters of faith, unsupervised preaching, misdirected charitable impulses among the gentry, and so on. 54 Many of these programs, and much of the economic theory of the time, stressed the need to put the poor to work. 55 But this impulse often did not take 52. See DYER, supra note 10, at 224 (suggesting that fifteenth-century labor regulation was intended to have an effect, but that it was highly impractical and says more about ruling-class social anxieties than about how labor was in fact regulated); see also Regardless of the strength of the evidence supporting Steinfeld's claim that labor was significantly coerced or that legislators, judges, and employers thought it could be coerced, his focus on coercion and "unfreedom" is strikingly important. Legal freedom and unfreedom were concepts at war with one another. There were three elements to this seventeenth-century paradox. First, most workers in early modem England were formally under some legal compulsion, as Steinfeld stresses (pp. 15-121, 243 n.36, 244 n.46). Second, the contrary notion that all Englishmen were free was widespread and increasingly important -indeed, contemporaries saw freedom as a defining characteristic of English law and English identity (pp. 95-101). Yet, third, English traders and settlers over the seventeenth century accommodated themselves to a labor regime of slavery -total unfreedom. Steinfeld's discussion of how English labor practices were reconciled with the growing ideology of English freedom is one of his finest (pp. . The reconciliation of the ideology of freedom with the new practice of colonial slavery is a matter outside the scope of his book; it is perhaps a more difficult issue, and one whose legacy is familiar and tragic for Americans.
The ideological emphasis on the freedom of the English was central to the legal definition of early modem freedom. Granted, pride in the freedom provided by common law was not new. All over medieval Europe, the doctrine arose that town air made one free, and English law applied a version of this. 57 Bracton, the great legal treatise of the early to mid-thirteenth century, contains references to the law's "favour for freedom" in dubious cases involving status, 58 and such eminent later jurists as Fortescue adopted favor libertatis as a proof text of the virtue of English law. But we now know that this medieval doctrine merely represented borrowed Roman learning, and that its value to medieval theory lay in protecting free men from wrongful degrada-56. SLACK, supra note 14, at 67-76 (including tion to servitude, rather than in fostering freedom as such. 59 By contrast, the Tudor-Stuart talk of freedom and common law rights was an important extension, in emphasis, volume, and consequences, of medieval rhetoric (pp. 95-101). "Rights-talk" and the perceived threat of enslavement were discussed in varied contexts. In some contexts, the argument held that an oppressed English group had already been "enslaved." 60 More often, the argument centered on one or another enemy seeking to enslave the virtuous English, who had managed to retain their birthright of freedom. Nor was this discussion of rights and freedom the exclusive domain of the political elite or of constitutional theorists. Litigation involved even laborers and husbandmen, and they too spoke the language of common law rights and freedom. 61 Somehow contemporaries reconciled the widespread notion that the English were free with the palpable fact that English men and women toiled in coercive labor. The traditional account of labor law, however, simply distinguishes personal status from labor institutions, thereby avoiding the question of how contemporaries accepted such dissonant answers. Steinfeld's subtler and more convincing approach frames an ideological model of freedom that rejects the dichotomy between free and unfree, borrowed from modem law. 62 Instead, his map of early modem status ranges from free (men of property), to coerced but free (all English labor), to rightless (aliens), to unfree (slaves, as well as subjects of foreign despots) (pp. 99-104). The elegance of Steinfeld's argument derives from his illustration that contemporaries viewed laborers and servants simultaneously as free and coerced, but that coercion did not imply that the laborer was unfree in the sense that a slave was unfree (pp. 95-101 This redefinition of the spectrum of freedom has considerable significance, both for Steinfeld's argument about free labor and for an understanding of the first steps the English colonies took toward adopting slave labor. By viewing early modem labor as free, that is, by taking its rhetorical claims seriously, we can understand the potency of the common law, even to the poor, and the availability of that common law as a resource that might occasionally support their claims against men of property. 64 By viewing early modem freedom as compatible with coercion, we can make sense of long-abandoned doctrines such as specific performance and criminal sanctions for breach of labor contracts. Labor coercion as a part of early modem freedom also helps explain the consistent use of assigned labor service, bridewells, and parish apprenticeships in England's unique, nationwide poor relief scheme. Finally, by appreciating the existence of coercion in English notions of freedom, we can begin to understand how the common law accepted racial slavery in the English colonies and, arguably, in England for a while. 65 By virtue of its contribution to the intellectual and legal underpinnings of the move to slavery in the common law world, this redefinition of the spectrum of early modem legal status is among the most important contributions of Steinfeld's book. 66 
Ill. STEINFELD'S ARGUMENT FOR THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR
The other part of Steinfeld's argument explains how the early modem paradigm of coerced labor yielded to the modem notion of free labor over the course of the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. At this point, his emphasis switches to colonial America and American evidence. He contends that early English settlers borrowed their notions of labor from English law, so that all (white) seventeenth-century laborers in the colonies worked under the same regime of practical unfreedom as in England. But by the early eighteenth century hired laborers and craftsmen in the colonies were accepted as free and mobile; the law ceased to enforce specific performance or criminal sanctions against their failure to find or complete work (pp. 50-51, 112-13, 121, 230 n.72). Only servants and apprentices remained sub- ject to coercion. Steinfeld completes his argument by explaining how, as part of a contentious and politicized process in the nineteenth century, certain labor institutions came to be seen as unfree and therefore illegitimate.
Why legal coercion was already deemed inappropriate for laborers and craftsmen by the eighteenth century, however, is a difficult question, and a definitive answer may come from social and economic rather than legal history. Perhaps the new freedom related to the relative availability of land. With a declining birthrate and rising real wages in late seventeenth-century England, opportunities were less bleak at home, and it grew harder to entice prospective migrants to the colonies. 67 Moreover, there was little incentive for colonial laborers, especially freedmen, to remain under a coercive labor regime, with land already taken or exhausted in the areas of old colonial settlement in the Tidewater and a growing native-born population. 68 New land was suddenly available because the frontier pushed into Indian lands in the early eighteenth century. Under such circumstances, it would have been difficult to keep laborers by relying principally on the stick of legal coercion. The materialist explanation, however, raises as many questions as it answers. For instance, it may be that eighteenthcentury America paradoxically was characterized not by abundant land, but rather by overcrowding and diminished opportunity. 69 If so, masters relaxed their disciplinary rights because they had marketbased alternatives to legal coercion. On the other hand, accepting the traditional view that land and opportunity were abundant, we describe circumstances that, in other cultures, have led to intensified labor discipline. 7 0 A better explanation for the new freedom of colonial wage laborers [Vol. 91:1382 relates it to the spread of slave labor, which exploded in numerical importance, especially in the southern colonies. 71 Suddenly, restraining white laborers and craftsmen was less important for masters because they had slaves as an alternative workforce. It was also harder to coerce white laborers because the ideological foundations of slavery became exclusively racial; by definition white labor was free, though the precise definition of freedom had yet to be developed. But under any view, the result of the new freedom of laborers and craftsmen was that only servants and apprentices were still unfree in the traditional sense (pp. 121, 130-33, 159-60) . Meanwhile, the legal theory justifying the practical unfreedom of servants and apprentices continued to be based on a combination of traditional property and jurisdictional notions. Steinfeld devotes considerable effort to showing that both common law (pp. 55-87) and early American law (pp. 55-57, 87-91) deemed coercion to be permissible because employers had both a leaselike property interest in the labor of their employees and jurisdictional rights to govern of those who labored under them.
Steinfeld's two alleged rationales for labor coercion -property and jurisdiction -did not entirely persuade me. His emphasis on the writ of covenant as a basis for the proprietary view of human labor distinguishes too sharply between covenant and other real actions on the basis of the alleged passing of property (pp. 28, 73-74, 157) , and it slights the fact that employers increasingly used personal actions of the trespass and case families. 72 The intriguing claim that late medieval labor was a community resource characterizes a few, isolated cases (pp. 5, 61, 63), but the typical suit against fugitive laborers alleged that they had abandoned obligations to particular employers, not to the manorial community. Steinfeld's effort to classify labor as a leaselike interest is suggestive, particularly in explaining the terminology of standard-form eighteenth-century indentures, 73 but it is far from conclusive. Similarly, the use of "wardship" in the sixteenth century does not, despite Steinfeld's claims (pp. 69, 72) , prove that the common law conceived of property interests in persons, but rather was one of many examples of "fiscal feudalism" by which the Tudor-Stuart Crown sought to extract new taxes and levies based on serviceable ancient to Slaves, supra note 67, at 356-58, 388 (speculating whether the free land thesis explains American servitude).
71. KULIKOFF, supra note 68, at 40, 45, 64-66, 320 ; MORGAN, supra note 36, at 299-309. legal doctrines. 74 As for Steinfeld's jurisdictional rationale, patriarchal jurisdiction was clearly in decline, as shown by its failure to account for the masterless men of the Tudor social landscape, but patriarchy revived in a variety of contexts well after 1750. Early captains of industry, such as Ambrose Crowley and Josiah Wedgwood, sought to impose labor regulatory schemes that rested exclusively on the rights of governance appurtenant to a head of household, 75 and jurisdiction and household governance were critical elements in the nineteenth-century support for slavery. Accordingly, patriarchal jurisdiction was a consistent, but very nuanced, theme in legal thought. Steinfeld insufficiently develops its relationship to the changing discourse about labor.
J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL
These are small points, however. Steinfeld is utterly persuasive about the compatibility of the property rationale with the capitalist ethos of the eighteenth century. He rightly begins by stressing enclosure, by which laborers lost common lands and rights. 76 At the level of high theory, the counterpart to this carving up of the remaining commons was the new "possessive individualism." One might expect that individualism, which acknowledged the juridically equal property and contract rights of all persons, would imply an ideology of "free labor" similar to that of the nineteenth century (pp. . But eighteenth-century individualists did not blush at continuing to coerce labor from their servants, apprentices, and slaves. Paradoxically, it may have been easier for individualists to accept slavery. Since blacks entered the English world from abroad, racism and xenophobia allowed theorists simply to ignore claims of humanity. As for legal considerations, the Romanesque doctrine of enslavement by captivity, which long occupied a wholly ornamental place in English law, 77 seemed sufficient to justify plantation slavery -even after most slaves were born within the colonies. But the coercion of servants was harder to explain in an age of possessive individualism: servants were not outsiders but English, and they and their labor ought to have been fully free.
Steinfeld's contribution to intellectual history deepens with his explanation of how coercion of formally free labor was consistent with the new capitalist ethos. Possessive individualism held only that each person had a property interest in his own labor; nothing constrained 74. Joel Hurstfield, The Profits of Fiscal Feudalism, 1541 -1602 , 8 EcoN. HIST. REV. 53 (2d ser. 1955 Guyora Binder, Masters, Slaves, and Emancipation, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1435 , 1441 (1989 (discussing what he terms "the cowardly contract"). [Vol. 91:1382 the right of an individual to give, sell, or lease his own labor. 78 Steinfeld shows that theorists of possessive individualism could justify the alienation of one person's labor to another in institutional forms that entailed coercion precisely because labor had long been legally regulated by analogy to property interests. 79 Accordingly, individualists could conclude that an apprentice or servant was fully free. By entering service, he voluntarily alienated, as any property owner could, the commodity within his ownership -his labor. 80 Steinfeld nicely fills out the possessive individualist thesis by explaining the older legal arguments available to eighteenth-century individualists. His argument, moreover, is consistent with the emergence of the individualist justification of plantation slavery. In De Jure Naturae et Gentium, Pufendorf conceded the weakness of the familiar "capture in just war" doctrine and instead revived the more obscure doctrine that "self-sale" legitimated slavery. 81 Steinfeld next shows how the map of free and unfree labor fell short of the modern, dichotomous picture of free and slave as late as the American Revolution and after. Landowners and wage workers were free, blacks slaves were not free, and servants and apprentices remained in between -free but subject to considerable legal disabilities and coercion. Somehow, however, in the fifty years after the Revolution, indentured servitude and apprenticeship came to be perceived as forms of slavery. Upon losing their institutional legitimacy, ALISM 214-20 (1962) . But see KEITH TRIBE, LAND, LABOUR AND EcONOMIC DISCOURSE 50, 51 (1978) (criticizing possessive individualism for failing to distinguish between sale of labor and sale of the capacity to labor, and thus for failing to distinguish the servant from the slave).
See generally C.B. MACPHERSON, THE PoLmCAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDU·
The famous examples of whether suicide or self-sale into slavery was permissible, on the grounds that they represented alienation or disposal of the property interest in oneself, illustrate the outer bounds of possessive individualism. Theorists rejected both options. As for slavery, theorists wondered what infinitely large consideration could suffice for such sale -especially since the money received for one's freedom would inevitably revert to the payor in his capacity as slaveowner. Pp. 100-01. As for suicide, natural law arguments about the sacredness of life were invoked to forbid it, thus rescuing individualism from its own logic. JOHN DUNN, THE POLIT· !CAL THEORY OF JOHN LoCKE 88-89, 125 (1969) they were quickly and quietly abolished in the first third of the nineteenth century.
Steinfeld concludes his argument with the little-known story of the antebellum emancipation of compelled free labor (pp. 147-72) . He attributes this legal emancipation -and it was almost exclusively legal, because the number of apprentices and indentured servants had already declined sharply -to the ideology and behavior of early nineteenth-century working people. Drawing on the scholarship concerning early nineteenth-century urban craftsmen and American class formation generally, a body of work to which he has already contributed, 82 Steinfeld shows that working people absorbed some of the radical, antihierarchical ideas of the Revolution and deployed these ideas to challenge indentured servitude (pp. . The crux of Steinfeld's argument is that indentures and apprenticeships disappeared because of ideological rejection, not because the market for them changed significantly. Indentured servants continued to be brought to the middle colonies, with interruptions only for the Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, and masters continued to purchase them, even in states where slavery was unpopular or prohibited (pp. 11-13, 164-65). Steinfeld reconciles antislavery sentiment with the increasing repudiation of indentured servitude by unpacking a number of fascinating encounters between employers, supported by legal precedent, and republican journeymen, sometimes backed by lawyers and merchants (pp. 164-77) . A form of trickle-up emancipation resulted, and by the 1820s legal authorities began to reject the ancient forms of coerced labor.
What are we to make of this engrossing narrative? Once again, there are a few unanswered questions. Indentured servants continued to be imported, as Steinfeld says, but the composition of the servant pool changed over the eighteenth century. Increasingly, arriving servants were skilled craftsmen, German families, or convicted English felons. 83 Steinfeld acknowledges this (pp. 89, 226 n.20), but he does not address whether and how the identity of the servants affected legal formulations of their status. For instance, did the fact that German families typically arrived under a different legal form of indenture 84 color the views of either the courts or the ideologically engaged urban workers? Given the nativist strand in early nineteenth-century cul- [Vol. 91:1382 ture, did the German arrivals face initial indifference to their status, and did these immigrants articulate their own notions of freedom? 85 In view of the importance of the rural nexus of American capitalism to recent scholarship, was there opposition to indentured servitude from farmers as well as urban craftsmen, and, if not, why did rural republicanism develop differently from its urban variant? 86 These mere quibbles, however, did not prevent this reader's enjoyment of Steinfeld's original, vigorously argued position. Refreshingly, the book does not end on a note of triumphant whiggery. Steinfeld stresses the centrality of the judicial repudiation of slavery-related cases, such as Mary Clark, in which indentures had been forced on freed slaves. 87 He steers clear of an encomium to the rejection of coerced free labor, instead devoting his last substantive discussion to midcentury peonage. Not surprisingly, such institutions as Chinese coolie labor and Indian peonage in the territories conquered from Mexico were only hesitantly abolished. 88 Steinfeld's brief survey of the latter in particular is a reminder of the racial and ethnic context in which freedom was inscribed. It offers an appropriately ambiguous note on which to end the history of a legal ideology of unfreedom.
IV. STEINFELD AS CRITICAL LEGAL HISTORIAN OF FREE LABOR
Twenty-five years ago The Invention of Free Labor would not have been written; sixty to one hundred years ago, many comparable books were written. The turn-of-the-century scholarship differed in many ways from Steinfeld's work, most importantly in that it sought to address labor relations and poverty through legal evidence rather than to address legal ideas directly. Given the extraordinary archival wealth of English law, the social and economic historians necessarily turned to legal evidence, and their efforts resulted in a body of distinguished scholarship on the legal history of labor and poor laws. 89 For the better part of this century, however, labor historians spurned legal evidence as crude or, at best, only a starting point. Historians learned to go beyond the statutes, cases, and legal handbooks that, along with literary evidence, had formed the trellis for Fabian 85. Steven J. Ross, The Transformation of Republican Ideology, 10 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 323, 330 (1990 labor histories. Later historians turned to new evidence, ranging from parish registers to handbills and other accounts that captured humble Englishmen in their own words. Historians learned the tools of other, related disciplines, ranging from demography and development economics to cultural anthropology and feminist theory. With new evidence and tools, there seemed no need to base the history of work and working people on legal records, legal institutions, and gentry perceptions. For two generations, scholars offered fine reconstructions of labor and the world of those who labored but little on how the law conceived of labor.
Steinfeld's book is important in part because of its renewed attention to specifically legal issues. Steinfeld views labor law not for its use as social evidence, and not as a set of doctrines that are interesting for their own sake, but rather as the embodiment of competing social and ideological ideas shaping beliefs and actions. From this perspective, Steinfeld is able to examine five centuries of labor law and to make meaningful generalizations about it. Steinfeld's aims and perspective identify his work as part of the critical legal studies (CLS) tradition, and this book represents a leading contribution to the growing body of ambitious CLS legal histories.9°
As CLS history, the book comes with a few signature features. Most obvious is the vocabulary. Like many CLS authors, Steinfeld writes of "appropriating" concepts and doctrines (pp. 90, 94, 169) ; the law in action is termed "experiential" (pp. 101, 160) ; ideas are "operationalized" (pp. 5, 94, 160, 163, 170) ; notions and legal formulations mediate the "contradictory" (pp. 94, 137, 160, pressures and deep "tensions" (pp. 105, 131) ; answers are "contingent" (p. 160); and the "play of interest" leads to any final result (pp. 155, 171) . But beyond its terminological influence, Steinfeld's legal history includes two valuable CLS themes. First, in his narrative, legal formulations are contingent, provisional, and contested. Second, Steinfeld focuses on the changing contours of notions like "free labor" as a fundamentally American story, in which American workers and, secondarily, courts were the critical agents of legal change. I will consider the implications of each claim.
To some, contingency is no longer a theme, but a historiographic cliche. To others, the notion of freedom being contingent or contradictory seems itself unclear. After all, to adherents of Whiggish history, there is little contingent or contradictory about the unfreedom of the medieval serf, the American plantation slave, or the Czech or Vol. 91:1382 Hungarian living under the Stalinist boot. But Steinfeld's examination of eighteenth-and nineteenth-century labor coercion is a fine case study for the argument that freedom and servitude are not inevitable or unchanging, and that they are not dependent on particular economic stages or institutions -in short, that freedom is contingent. Freedom is a socially constructed, ascribed category, and its legal formulation is the result of mediation by different actors and interests. This argument will be familiar to devotees of CLS history and unconvincing to many of its critics. What I found most persuasive about Steinfeld's reconstruction of freedom and unfreedom is how well it fits with another, controversial area of legal history that few CLS have addressed: medieval freedom. 91 A brief outline of English medieval legal status serves to underscore the extent to which Steinfeld's description of freedom as a disputed, multiplicitous, and shifting notion can enrich the analysis of an earlier period.
At the time of Domesday Book (1086), there were a few slaves (servi); nationally, the figure was approximately ten percent. 92 A variety of occupational and regional classifications served to label peasants, but most were free in that they were full members of a village community -the opposite of a slave. At the same time, however, "the [Domesday] villanus both is and is not a free man," 93 for the term "free man" also appeared in contemporary records to indicate a person entitled, unlike most villani, to direct access to public institutions, most notably the courts of shire and hundred. Other, local status compilations also portrayed an agrarian world with numerous status classes of dependent persons that ranged from fully free men to chattel slaves. 94 Over the course of the twelfth century, this broad middle range of status classes was squeezed until the legal writers saw a world of only free and serf. A series of local processes that left no single "smoking gun" seems to have emancipated Domesday's slaves while degrading the larger class of "free" peasants. 95 By the early thirteenth century, 91 . But see Guyora Binder, Angels and Infidels: Hierarchy and Historicism in Mediel'a/ Legal History, 35 BUFF. L. REv. 527 (1986 PAST & PRESENT, July 1965 , at 3, 4-5, reprinted in PEASANTS, KNIGHTS AND HERETICS 174, 175-76 (R.H. Hilton ed., 1976 48 MEDIEVAL STUD. 470, 474-75 (1986) .
95. MAITLAND, supra note 93, at 35; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 5, at 430-31; TITOW, supra note 11, at 57. Hatcher has recently challenged whether this meant any change in the new common law defined freedom to exclude perhaps most of the peasantry. 96 Vil/anus no longer referred to the ordinary villager, as it had in Domesday, but to the unfree villager or common law villein, while servus implied the serf or villein rather than Domesday's chattel slave. Meanwhile, local histories show that the meaningful distinction in reality may not have been between free and unfree peasants, but rather between peasants, free or not, with guaranteed access to land on favorable customary terms and the growing class of legally free landless laborers and cottagers. 97 But whatever the advantages of manorial membership, even on unfree terms, we also know that peasants resisted and occasionally purchased their way out of unfree personal status and its stigma. 98 Moreover, the overlap between personal status and land tenure, and the new jurisdictional definitions imposed by the common law complicated the map of legal freedom. 99 By the mid-thirteenth century, the new common law system defined unfreedom or villeinage largely as the denial of access to the common law courts. It was circular for judges to say "a man is free if he can come into royal court and can come into court if he is free," but the judges had no other choice. Every other legal test of freedom -liability to various kinds of feudal dues or work obligations, biological descent, common reputeproved inadequate to describe the range of tenurial and status relations in the thousands of English manors.
Serf age was the paradigm of unfreedom, but full access to the common law was denied to other groups as well, including foreign merchants, forest dwellers, inhabitants of certain franchisal lordships, the conquered Irish, and the Jews. Each of these groups experienced the shared disability of alternative courts and law -the serf his manorial lord, the Irishman his feudal lord and the local Irish chancery and parliament, the townsman his chartered borough court, the foreign merchant his chartered liberties, the monk his Ordinary and the church courts, the Jew his religious court (beth din) and the royal Ex- [Vol. 91:1382 chequer of the Jews. No one considered any of these persons a servus in the sense of a tied agricultural laborer, though contemporaries occasionally employed the vocabulary of servitude. 100
In this emerging common law framework, legal vulnerability and exclusion, rather than labor coercion as such, were the hallmarks of unfreedom, even for serfs. In time, certain rights of alien merchants were recognized in the Magna Carta and elsewhere, but such protection was of little practical import as their legal privileges fluctuated with royal need.101 As for the Jews, the repeated confiscatory taxes of the thirteenth century and their eventual expulsion from England in 1290 illustrate the price of legal exclusion. Lacking the protection of custom, the excluded groups were among the few royal resources taxable without limit at a time when other, "free" groups succeeded in imposing limits on the reach of Angevin government. 102 Jurisdiction and legal protection served as the basis of the new definition of freedom, and outsiders were meaningfully unfree.
One hundred years earlier, however, freedom meant not access to the common law -of which there was none yet -but having one's own law. 103 Almost everybody had the privilege of a special legal "deal." This was the essence of the early medieval and Carolingian notions of freedom and fairly describes English notions until the late twelfth century. The foreign merchants, townsmen, and Jews secured charters of protection guaranteeing the right to inherit at customary reliefs, assess and collect their own taxes, be exempt from judicial visitations, have their fellows on juries when they were sued, select their own leaders, and be governed generally by their own customary rules. Being outsiders to a nascent royal legal system meant little hardship. If an outsider needed to opt into royal law, he might do that too -the earliest Pipe Rolls document suitors buying the discretionary boon of royal justice. 104 By the mid-thirteenth century, however, to be kept outside the expanding common law -still to be unfree -was to be isolated and vulnerable rather than privileged. Milsom has written of "a transformation of elementary legal ideas" 105 with respect to property in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and the same processes created new notions of law, royal power, and freedom in England, and perhaps elsewhere. 106 "Like serfs, Jews were one of the groups in the kingdom which failed to make the transition in the late 12th century from a basically Carolingian legal world of liberties to an essentially modern legal world which regarded liberty as a matter of civil rights guaranteed by a common law."101
In short, the medieval concept of freedom was Steinfeldian. Notions of freedom changed, and different authorities had distinct understandings of freedom. Persons could be free in one setting and unfree in another. Persons disputed the status ascribed to them and adhered to earlier normative understandings of their legal disabilities. Freedom sometimes meant "free from" or "so free that"; 108 at other times it embodied a more absolute notion; in other contexts it had political overtones, as with Jews and alien merchants.
Moreover, the common law's own doctrines of freedom and villeinage embodied the complex fit between different social and legal understandings of freedom. As Maitland pointed out, English villeinage was no ordinary doctrine of serfdom. 109 Instead of defining a class of partly free laborers bound in serfage -a straightforward legal taskcommon law set out a slippery set of doctrines in which a serf was simultaneously wholly unfree (with respect to his lord) and wholly free (with respect to the world). Consequently, medieval freedom is complex not only because it represented a moving line or unrealistically corresponded to social divisions, but also because, at least in its common law formulation, it was relative and contingent. Freedom was a line running through each serf, defining him as free or unfree depending on what he was doing and with whom. This is a startlingly modern conception, and likely it was too theoretical for judges to implement fully. But its mere formulation suggests how far medieval freedom was from an inherited legal status, clear to all observers and changeable only by flight or manumission.
Steinfeld's model of contingent labor freedom holds important lessons for reconstructing the changing, disputed notions of medieval freedom. Narrowly, Steinfeld focuses on how early modem labor was coerced and yet still understood as free, and how this changed in the nineteenth century. But in broader terms, Steinfeld constructs a model of freedom that rejects straight-line Whiggish evolutionism, denies the iron force of economic determinism on legal categorization, and uses legal material to escape the common law's stated categories of free and unfree. Steinfeld uses the insights of CLS to present a nuanced model of early modem labor freedom. He succeeds in developing the disputed and multiplicitous meanings of legal freedom. His argument and methodology will be instructive for those who seek to extend his efforts to a period before his mid-fourteenth-century starting point.
Those who tum to Steinfeld's work for its English common law teachings should be warned of one final point, however. Like much CLS scholarship, Steinfeld's book is infused with a heavy dose of American essentialism. His focus simply switches to America when the narrative reaches 1700. The best parts of Steinfeld's story unfold on this side of the Atlantic. Both the actual removal of specific performance and criminal sanctions from hired labor in the eighteenth century (pp. 112-13) and the invention of the idea of modem free labor in the nineteenth century (pp. 159-60) take place in America. Steinfeld follows the recent practice of stressing the rediscovered American Revolution, which languished for so long in progressive historiography as a distant afterthought to the French, Russian, and even the socalled English Revolutions. Steinfeld's craftsmen and yeomen struggle for and achieve the final repudiation of the ancient institutions of labor servitude, partly because they are awakened by the Revolutionary experience and its ideology (pp. 167) . Of course, Steinfeld is far too careful a historian to argue that England remained a nation of deferential laborers with attitudes typified by the laborers in Ronald Blythe's evocative Aken.field. 110 But he clearly concludes that practical and ideological changes unfolded first in America.
There are good reasons for focusing on American developments, but Steinfeld's analysis of the emancipation of labor may be persuasive enough to apply to English labor as well. He cites the work of Douglas Hay in support of the proposition that labor coercion stayed on the books in English law until as late as the 1870s (pp. 115-16, 243 n.36, 244 n.46, 248 n.82 tory labor framework remained, strengthened by the newer Combination Acts (1799 and 1801). But even in the early nineteenth century, when the Combination Acts were in effect, laborers could seek higher wages by way of a wage reassessment under the Statute of Artificers; strangely, one of the decaying Tudor act's chief uses was to shield this form of collective labor activity. 112 As the nineteenth century wore on, important parts of the Combination Acts were repealed, as were other oppressive labor rules. 113 Even during the early nineteenth-century heyday of coercive labor, the statutes were imperfect vehicles for labor coercion, and English judges occasionally determined that the common law of riot and conspiracy also failed to provide the tools to crack down on a particular labor activity; 114 another instance of law constraining those who made it. 115 In short, English labor law may have been "contested" in much the same way as American law.
Nor was the configuration of English labor law chiefly the result of legal weakness or political benevolence, as some have argued. 116 We have a rich scholarship on English class formation and labor resistance -including hundreds of strikes -in the eighteenth century. 117 As long ago as the Webbs, scholars traced the fledgling but continuous workingmen's institutions that were the seedbed of the union movement.118 These scholars found that working people were not only the passive victims of industrialization, but that they formed institutions that actively articulated their aspirations. As for the criminal sane- [Vol. 91:1382 tions, those whom the law punished for leaving work were frequently not errant individuals, but individuals and groups participating in strikes, particularly in the mines and the iron industry. 119 In other words, the English criminal sanctions are best seen as a peripheral feature in the larger context of a collective class struggle. That the criminal sanctions lasted longer in England is less important than the fact that, in both countries, organizing and collective work stoppages were illegal and remained so, and that working people challenged this illegality against the odds. They did so by using the rhetoric of rights and revolution, even if English activists did not use the rhetoric of popular republicanism that historians have identified in the American discourse.
The parallel evolution of English and American labor law also existed in areas outside of the direct regulation of wage labor. Thus, the abolition movement against slavery began its uneven rise in the late eighteenth century in both England and America. Among whites, it began as a cause of the middle classes, but abolition also gained modest acceptance among working people in both countries. 120 Both countries abolished the slave trade and then slavery, in stages. Finally, after black emancipation in both the British Empire and America, employers attempted to employ Asian contract labor; in other words, as Steinfeld concludes in the American context (pp. , it was still not inevitable that coerced labor was deemed to be slavery or that the abolition of the latter meant the end of the various forms of peonage.121 Overall, both English and American law repudiated slave labor over the course of the nineteenth century, and in both countries working people, and eventually the law as well, came to view all forms of coerced labor as uncomfortably akin to slavery. The picture that emerges is one of parallelism, not American innovation, giving Steinfeld's model of labor emancipation even broader application than he attempts.
In fact, the question might better be framed not in terms of whether legal change occurred first in America, but why CLS legal history focuses on change here. The explanation lies at the heart of CLS. A major strand of CLS scholarship is devoted to unpacking, even deconstructing, mainstream legal doctrine. Special emphasis has always been devoted to legal history in general, and to late nineteenthcentury formalism in particular, to explain legal change under American industrial capitalism. 122 If this can be done at the expense of "straight" scholarship, so much the better -hence the CLS tradition of "trashing." 123 The result has been entertaining and important analytic work but also a perceived reluctance to articulate a positive program, a failure for which even sympathetic observers have criticized the movement. 124 Like earlier radicals, however, at least some in the CLS movement have found a provisional agenda in modern, radicalized readings of foundational American legal texts, notably the Declaration of Independence. This is why so many scholars want to appropriate Thomas Jefferson and his legacy.12s
Perhaps the obscure case of Robertson v. Baldwin 126 holds the clue to Steinfeld's focus on the American invention of free labor. The Supreme Court held that runaway sailors could be seized and compelled to finish their terms of service, notwithstanding the Thirteenth Amendment. Steinfeld cites the case to illustrate the persistence of traditionalist notions of coerced labor (p. 251 n.36). But Justice Harlan's Jeffersonian dissent speaks more directly to Steinfeld's project: Who cares about inherited common law structures? We are Americans, new men, created and, in the Reconstruction Amendments, recreated as a nation under the sheltering wing of new emancipatory ideas. We can do better. It is this fundamental American vision that continues to animate the work of Steinfeld and others.
